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Abstract—A significant number of cryptographic 
architectures rely on the efficient and resilient implementation of 
the Montgomery modular multiplier. One of the most used 
attacks on cryptographic implementations is based on 
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) or one of its variants. In this 
paper, a specially adjusted Latch-less Asynchronous Charge 
Sharing Logic (LACSL) is developed to inherently defend such 
architecture against DPA attacks. The proposed logic provides 
input data independent low-power/energy consumption which is 
attributed to interleaved charge sharing stages with non-static 
elements involved in the data path. A 32-bit LACSL Montgomery 
Multiplier (case study) is extensively tested through HSPICE 
simulations and great consistency in power/energy consumption 
is achieved. The normalized energy deviation and normalized 
standard deviation are only 0.048 and 0.011, respectively. 
Compared with the original ACSL implementation, besides the 
impressive energy coherence, 42% energy saving is demonstrated 
plus that the leakage power is 3.5 times smaller. Furthermore, 
the scalability of the proposed multiplier is explored where 64-
bit, 128-bit and 256-bit designs are implemented. Again, great 
energy consistency is found with the highest deviation being 
0.5%. The proposed techniques can be easily migrated to other 
low-power circuits for which accurate power/energy models can 
be built, independent of the input data profile. 
Keywords—asynchronous; modular arithmetic; charge sharing 
logic; side channel attack; input data independent energy circuits 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Embedded cryptographic systems must be protected against 
Side Channel Attacks (SCAs). These attacks exploit 
correlations between data manipulated inside the chip (e.g., 
secret keys) and externally measured parameters such as 
computation timing [1], power consumption [2], or electro-
magnetic radiations [3]. In this paper, we focus on 
power/energy consumption because only low-cost equipment is 
required to attack embedded cryptographic systems such as 
smart-cards. Several types of power attacks exist: Simple 
Power Analysis (SPA) exploits one or a few traces while DPA 
[2] uses statistical techniques over a large set of recorded 
traces. DPA, and its numerous variants, is considered as an 
important threat for symmetric as well as for asymmetric 
cryptography implementations in embedded systems.  
Many SCAs against Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
implementations have been proposed (see [4] for a survey). In 
the same time, various protections schemes, or counter-
measures, have been adapted or proposed for ECC [5]. Various 
uniformization schemes have been proposed for ECC: uniform 
formulas, regular scalar multiplication algorithms (e.g., double-
and-add-always, Montgomery ladder [6], addition chains [7], 
etc.). Most of those protections behave at the curve operations 
level.  
Montgomery algorithm [8] is one of the most popular 
modular multiplication method both for GF(2m) and GF(p) 
finite fields (ECC) and integers (RSA). Thereby the multiplier 
based on this algorithm serves as the kernel of these 
cryptosystems, called the Montgomery Multiplier (MM). 
Numerous hardware MMs have been proposed in [9], [10], 
which are designed for low-power consumption. Several FPGA 
implementations can be found in [11], [12], [13]. However, 
none of them exhibits the data independent power/energy 
consumption property. 
In multipliers, internal data transitions (both complete ones 
as well as glitches) strongly impact the instantaneous power of 
the unit (see [14]  for activity evaluation in general hardware 
multipliers). This dependency between the manipulated data 
and power profile makes the circuits vulnerable to DPA. 
Multiplier algorithms and architectures can be modified to 
remove this dependency. In [15], several algorithmic and 
architecture-level modifications have been proposed to design 
more secure GF(2m) multipliers for ECC.  
In [16] and [17], a novel CMOS logic and a dynamic look-
up table technique have been proposed to address the challenge 
of data dependent power consumption but their utilization is 
limited relatively small circuits, i.e., 3 states detector circuit, S-
boxes, etc.. However, there is no glitch occurrence in their 
implementations.  
Asynchronous logic can be used at the circuit level to 
suppress (or at least significantly reduce) this dependency 
(ideally no glitches). In [18] an asynchronous interleaved 
multiplier based unit is proposed. In [1] an asynchronous wave 
pipeline implementation of an ECC processor based on the 
Massey-Omura multiplier is proposed. But these two designs 
mainly focus on the performance level rather than on data 
security and no power/energy results are reported. 
In this paper, we investigate a circuit-level protection for 
modular multiplication units based on Montgomery algorithm 
for ECC applications (but it can also be easily adapted to 
RSA). The proposed MM is based on an adjusted version 
Asynchronous Charge Sharing Logic (ACSL), called Latch-
less ACSL (LACSL) which successfully eliminates the latch 
utilization between adjacent stages. In doing so, 40% lower 
than standard ACSL power consumption is achieved. 
Moreover, thanks to the exclusion of latches, our MM is more 
robust against DPA with Normalized Energy Deviation 
(NED)=0.048 and Normalized Standard Deviation 
(NSD)=0.011. We note that the proposed solution is not a 
complete countermeasure against DPA but it provides a circuit 
level protection scheme to increase the ECC security in 
embedded applications. While most of the protection work is at 
the curve operation level, we deal with finite field arithmetic 
level as a first layer of protection on top of which secure scalar 
multiplication algorithms can be used with a decreased cost. 
The paper is organized in the following structure. In 
Section II, ACSL background is given, and LACSL is 
proposed. The MM based on LACSL is explained in Section 
III. The implementation results are discussed in Section IV and 
the paper is concluded in Section V with some future works. 
II. LATCH-LESS ASYNCHRONOUS CHARGE SHARING LOGIC 
In this section, first the general introduction of ACSL is 
briefed, such as the basic function block, and operation flow. 
Then, the proposed LACSL is discussed along with the 
comparisons with the original ACSL. 
A. Background of Asynchronous Charge Sharing Logic 
Asynchronous Charge Sharing Logic [19] is an 
asynchronous logic family that relies on charge sharing 
techniques to reduce the power consumption. ACSL uses 
adiabatic gate designs but does not require the power-clock to 
operate in an adiabatic fashion [20] and thus it is not itself an 
adiabatic logic family. Adiabatic logic aims to achieve the low 
power consumption by turning on and off the transistors 
slowly, which results in considerably small current through the 
transistors. Instead ACSL recovers energy from each stage 
through charge sharing. This has several advantages, such as 
exclusion of inductors and asynchronous operation. While 
ACSL does not provide the theoretical power saving potential 
of adiabatic logic, in practice it achieves similar savings. In 
average, ACSL saves 40% to 50% power over straight 
dynamic logic (requiring pre-charging), while adiabatic 
operation saves 50% to 60%. ACSL is based on the Positive 
Feedback Adiabatic Logic (PFAL) [21], building upon its gate 
structure depicted in Figure 1. The PFAL (also ACSL) gate 
consists of two cross-coupled inverters with a NMOS pull-up 
network in parallel with the inverter PMOS on the true side and 
a complementary NMOS network on the inverse output side. 
Evaluation is carried out through the Voltage Power-Clock 
(VPC), which is zero when the circuit is idle. As the VPC is 
raised the NMOS pull-up tree will set one output of the gate. 
As the VPC rises, the inverter network will hold the opposite 
side low and maintain the upward pull-on the set side. The 
attractiveness of ACSL resides in the fact that the drawbacks of 
variability associated with charge sharing logic are 
compensated by the asynchronous logic properties. 
ACSL has been proved for its low-power characteristic in 
both dynamic and static aspects over other asynchronous logic 
families thanks to integrating charge-sharing technology with 
 
Figure 1. PFAL function block schematic. 
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Figure 2. ACSL operation flow (a) and signal transition diagrams (b). 
 
power gating technique [19]. The operation flow and signal 
transition diagrams of three stages are depicted in Figure 2. It 
can be seen that ACSL operates in a pipelined fashion utilizing 
handshaking protocol. The units related to VPCs are the 
cornerstone of ACSL. The Ctrl signals trigger the change of 
VPCs while VPCs also served as completion detection signals. 
Detailed explanation can be found in [19]. With balanced 
capacitive distribution of the architecture, high energy transfer 
efficiency and great power consumption consistency can also 
been achieved.  
B. Latch-less Asynchronous Charge Sharing Logic 
 Due to the static storage element involved between each 
evaluation logic stage in ACSL, the power consistency of the 
whole system has to be compromised. To defend against DPA 
attacks, it is crucial to adjust ACSL by eliminating those static 
units and therefore to avoid leakage of information from power  
 
 
Figure 3. Block diagram of latch-less ACSL. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. ACSL handshaking protocol. 
 
inconsistency. One possible way is to substitute the static latch 
with a dual-rail dynamic latch. Unfortunately, the subsequent 
high power/energy consumption is thereby inevitable. On the 
other hand, it is not practical to exclude the storage elements 
directly either, as this would deteriorate the ACSL stability. 
Without data retention devices, once the charge sharing 
finishes, the input data for the next stage might not be valid 
(only at half VDD), the consequent unequal voltage distribution 
not only slowing down the evaluation speed but also leading to 
possible error occurrences like the write error in SRAM cells. 
To tackle this problem, interleaved charge sharing is 
considered because it could intuitively solve the unbalanced 
voltage situation discussed above. Figure 3 displays the block 
diagram of the LACSL. It can be seen that Voltage Power 
Clocks (VPCi, i=1..4) now handshake with at least one 
isolation stage rather than communicate directly between two 
adjacent stages as that in Figure 2(a). By doing this, input data 
for each stage is always fully charged during the computation. 
Moreover, it brings other improvements in terms of 
performance, area and power consumption as will be presented 
in next section. The main adjustment needed in LACSL is to 
re-design the VPC-CTRL circuit to maintain the power-up 
situation across the stages with minimum overhead. The logic 
units as well as VPC-SHR maintain the same designs as those 
in [19]. It is worth mentioning that the control signals of 
LACSL are the same as those in standard ACSL despite of the 
updates on VPCs. For the conventional ACSL, the control 
signal of an individual stage is only valid when the control 
signals of two adjacent stages are low. The signal transition 
diagram of ACSL handshaking protocol is illustrated in Fig.4. 
III. MONTGOMERY MULTIPLIER BASED ON LACSL 
Efficient and resilient implementation of the Montgomery 
modular multiplier is well desired in a significant number of 
cryptographic architectures. There are various designs of 
modular Montgomery multiplier introduced in [11-15]. The 
Carry Save Adder (CSA) based Montgomery modular 
multiplier is a popular alternative well known for its high 
throughput. In [22], an efficient CSA architecture for 
Montgomery multiplier depicted in Figure 5 is proposed where 
X,Y and M are the multiplicand, the multiplier and the modulus, 
respectively and let n be the number of digits in their binary 
representation. The modulus M needs to be relatively prime to 
the radix, i.e. there exists no common divisor for M and the 
radix. The multiplicand and the multiplier need to be smaller 
than M.  
The main feature of this design is that it utilizes only two 
CSA arrays to carry out computation through iterations. The re-
use of those two CSAs is the key operation where shift registers 
are necessary. The data-independent power consumption could 
be realized once each iteration/loop consumes the same amount 
of power, which could be significant for keeping the 
information safe from a DPA attack. However, several 
modifications on this architecture must be taken care of in 
order to use latch-less ACSL.  
First, in Figure 5, shift registers synchronized by the loop 
signal are still present. On the other hand, if LACSL is applied, 
shift registers are then no longer essential while the same 
functionality can be accomplished by simple re-wiring as 
everything is triggered under the remits of the handshaking 
protocol.  
Second, as it can be seen in Figure 5 the data fed into both 
CSAs are from the output of AND gates and previous CSAs. 
This makes the timing control somewhat more complex for 
LACSL as the inputs arrival time must be synchronized. To 
overcome this, we re-arrange the CSA, which internally are 
individual Full Adders (FA), into two layers. The first layer 
consists of the conventional Half Adders (HA) while the 
second layer consists of HAs and OR gates. The block diagram 
of the proposed CSA based architecture is presented in Figure 
6. The first layer of HAs can thereby be placed at the same 
level with AND gates (Xi and Y as inputs), which fixes the 
initial input-data sequence problem. Now every level of data-
path has only the input coming from the previous stage. 
Furthermore, the capacitive load is still balanced for each pair 
of VPC sharing stage (VPC1↔VPC3; VPC2↔VPC4) although 
two neighboring stages have different load (size of circuits).  
Thus far, all necessary conditions for the realization of an 
LACSL based Montgomery multiplier have been described. As 
the cornerstone of the entire operation, VPC execution 
processes (Charging, Sharing, Discharging) are the most 
significant.  
Figure 7 illustrates the operation flow of 4 stages LACSL. 
Figure 8 presents the simulation waveforms indicating the 
voltage changes at each stage. 
It can be concluded that during the sharing of two leaping 
stages, the other two maintain their previous level. According 
to the extensive simulation, the sharing operation is swift and 
steady. In next section, implementation results of LACSL MMs 
would be thoroughly discussed. 
 
Figure 5. Architecture of CSA based Montgomery multiplier [22]. 
 
Figure 6. Architecture of LACSL CSA based Montgomery multiplier. 
 
 
Figure 7. VPCs operation flow of LACSL.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Waveforms representing voltage changes at each stage. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS 
Various sizes of LACSL MMs are implemented, ranging 
from 32-bit to 256-bit while the 32-bit one is extensively 
investigated to verify its resistance against DPA. Meanwhile, a 
32-bit ACSL based design is also implemented and compared 
in order to demonstrate the LACSL advantages, such as energy 
consistency and low energy characteristic. All circuits are 
designed using 45nm CMOS technology, where VDD=1V, 
Vthn=0.32V, Vthp= -0.31V, and simulated using HSPICE.  
For the 32-bit MMs, two main tests are set-up as follows: 1) 
fixed X, fixed M, various Y with different Hamming weights 
ranging from 10 to 22, where power, delay, energy data per 
iteration for both LACSL and ACSL MMs are recorded (32 
iterations per operand Y); 2) 100 sets of random X, fixed M, 
random Y where total energy during the course for the LACSL 
MM is obtained.  
For the 64-bit, 128-bit, and 256-bit LACSL MMs, 10 
iterations of random input vectors with corresponding bit-width 
are generated and simulated.  In spite of input size doubled and 
redoubled, the logic depth remains the same so that the overall 
delay should be close if the sizes of VPC-CTRL and VPC-SHR 
are proportionally scaled. The main distinction is in the total 
number of iterations and the corresponding energy 
consumption, which depends on the input-width size.  
A. 32-bit LACSL Montgomery Multiplier 
The power, delay and energy per iteration are measured. 
First, Figure 9 depicts the power consumption from the LACSL 
MM and ACSL MM in scattered fashion. It is rather consistent 
(around 250uW) for the LACSL design in contrast to that of 
the ACSL MM whose distribution is quite decentralized. It can 
thereby be anticipated that the energy consumption would also 
be constant if each iteration/cycle takes equal length of time. 
The Probability Density Functions (PDFs) of cycle time of 
LACSL and ACSL MMs are shown in Figure 10. The cycle 
time refers to the delay for each loop. For LACSL, it ranges 
from 1.72ns to 1.77ns while it is a bit larger for the ACSL 
counterpart. The adjustment made on LACSL improve the 
performance a bit rather than compromise it. The Power Delay 
Products (PDPs) of these two models, also regarded as energy 
consumption, are illustrated in Figure 11 where the high spike 
represents the energy of LACSL, around 450fJ. On the other 
hand, the energy consumption of ACSL spreads relatively 
widely as well as it is higher than that of LACSL.  
The corresponding energy consumption data are 
summarized in Table I, where the minimum/maximum energy 
per cycle over total 416 simulated cycles is listed. In the same 
table, the Normalized Energy Deviation (NED) is defined as: 
=
( / ) - ( / )
( / )
Max energy cycle Min energy cycle
NED
Max energy cycle
  (1) 
Meanwhile, SD is the standard deviation of the energy per 
cycle, and the Normalized Standard Deviation (NSD) is 
defined as: 
( / )
SD
NSD
Mean energy cycle
=                  (2) 
      It can be easily observed that LACSL outperforms the 
conventional ACSL, even the MAX energy consumption of 
LACSL is smaller than the MIN energy consumption of ACSL. 
The average energy consumption reduction against ACSL is 
42% in this case. Moreover, NED is reduced from 0.65 for 
ACSL to 0.048 for LACSL, i.e., more than 13 times. NSD 
shrinks from 0.29 to as little as 0.011 thanks to the elimination 
of static storage elements. 
 As mentioned at the beginning of this section, other than 
the data for iterations, we also collect the energy for 100 sets of 
random inputs over the entire calculation for the LACSL MM. 
The data are also summarized in Table I accordingly. The 
corresponding NED and NSD get further decreased by 5 and 7 
times, respectively.  
 Additionally, leakage power for both designs in idle mode 
is also recorded. For the ACSL MM, it consumes 7.1µW where 
the LACSL counterpart only dissipates 2.05µW, nearly 3.5 
times smaller. Furthermore, the transistor count for the LACSL 
32-bit MM is 3912 in contrast to 5224 to the ACSL one. 
As mentioned in the Introduction (Section I), the algorithm 
and architecture level protections proposed in [15] for secure 
multipliers reduce the variations of the electrical activity in the 
circuit. But there are still a few percent variations in the best 
case. On the other hand, in [16] and [17], two approaches were 
introduced with impressive NEDs and NSDs. In [16], the NED 
and NSD for a XOR gate implemented in 0.35µm CMOS 
process are 0.13 and 0.05, respectively. In [17], for S7-Box 
implemented in 0.12µm CMOS technology, the corresponding 
NEDs and NSDs for both pre-layout and post-layout designs 
are 0.0014, 0.0003, and 0.0402 and 0.0102, respectively. It 
should be noted that both of these two models (XOR gate and 
S7-Box) are without propagation, which means there is no 
glitch at all. Therefore, it is difficult to directly compare them 
with our LACSL MMs since our design is more complicated 
than theirs.  
Moreover, there are circuit-level techniques where dual-rail 
or multi-rail encoding of data are used [23]. They are dedicated 
to reduce current variations when the loads of all rails are 
 
Figure 9. Scattered plots of LACSL power data and ACSL power data. 
 
 
Figure 10. Cycle time of  LACSL MM and ACSL MM PDFs. 
   
Figure 11. Energy consumption of LACSL MM and ACSL MM PDFs. 
 
balanced. Compared to our LACSL solution, these multi-rail 
approaches lead to considerable area overhead and require 
high accuracy clock distribution circuits to ensure the load 
balancing of all logical gates and flip-flops. 
 
TABLE I. SUMMARY OF ENERGY DATA 
32-bit MMs ACSL per cycle 
LACSL per 
cycle 
LACSL per 
Operand X,Y 
MAX(fJ) 1288 439 14832 
MIN(fJ) 450 418 14698 
NED 0.65 0.048 0.009 
SD(fJ) 215 4.7 23 
Mean(fJ) 733 428 14752 
NSD 0.29 0.011 0.0015 
Leakage 
Power(µW) 7.1 2.05 2.05 
 
TABLE II. SUMMARY OF AVERAGE POWER, DELAY, ENERGY 
LACSL MMs 64-bit 128-bit 256-bit 
Avg. Power (uW) 500 1046 1970 
Avg. Cycle (ns) 1.9 2.0 2.1 
Avg. Energy (fJ) 950 2092 4137 
Avg. Energy Deviation 0.5% 0.5% 0.3% 
 
B. Scability of LACSL Montgomery Multiplier 
We use LFSRs to generate input vector for each LACSL 
MM with different bit-width to briefly explore the scalability of 
the proposed design. The selected bit-widths are 64-bit, 128-bit 
and 256-bit. Table II lists the average data of 10 iterations for 
these three different bit-width MMs while the average 
deviations are calculated. Since there is not sufficient data for 
statistical analysis due to the expensive simulation time and 
memory requirement, NED and NSD are not available. 
However, good LACSL scalability can be observed at first 
glance.  The highest average deviation is 0.5% for both 64-bit 
and 128-bit MMs while it is only 0.3% for the 256-bit one. 
Energy per cycle simulation data of three LACSL MMs are 
plotted in Figure 12 where the consistency is clear to see.  
C. Summary 
The feature of explicit power consistency is embraced in the 
LACSL based Montgomery multipliers according to the data 
above which strongly shows the potential of application against 
DPA attacks. LACSL arithmetic operators can be used as a 
partial protection against side-channel attacks. In classical 
operators, the large power variations are used by the attacker to 
get strong information the time boundaries of the low-level 
operations (e.g., finite-field operations for ECC) and then use 
these information to guess what are the higher level operations 
(e.g., curve level operations for ECC). Using LACSL 
operators, this type of time references are not easily accessible 
anymore. It is hasty to say ACSL operators are totally 
protected against power analysis side-channel attacks but they 
significantly increase the number of traces to be collected for 
the DPA attacks.  
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A circuit-level protection for modular multiplication units 
based on the Montgomery algorithm for Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography applications is presented along with the 
proposed Latch-less Asynchronous Charge Sharing Logic. It is 
shown that in our implementation the power/energy 
consumption is independent on the input data distribution 
which is a great asset in safeguarding against side channel 
attacks such as Differential Power Analysis. The normalized 
energy deviation and normalized standard deviation are 0.048 
and 0.011 respectively, remarkably lower than those of the
  
 
Figure 12. Energy consumption of different sized LACSL. 
 
 
original Asynchronous Charge Sharing Logic. Over 40% 
energy reduction is obtained as well. Moreover, the scalability 
of the LACSL Montgomery Multiplier is also demonstrated by 
doubling and re-doubling the operand bit width where the 
average energy deviation is less than 0.5%. The proposed 
LACSL methodology can be applied to other cryptographic 
algorithms and architectures including RSA. However, the 
proposed solution is not a complete countermeasure against 
DPA but it provides a circuit level protection scheme to 
increase the security of ECC in embedded applications.  
Further research and low level design will be required to 
analyze the impact of layout on the proposed methodology. A 
future work may be also the design of a complete crypto 
processor where arithmetic units, internal registers and control 
elements are all implemented using LACSL. 
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